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On Harry Frankfurt’s “Equality
as a Moral Ideal”*
Thomas MulliganIt is natural to think that there is something wrong with inequality. Many
people share an intuition that interpersonal differences in wealth, in-
come, and other goods are unjust, an intuition which has given rise to
egalitarian theories of distributive justice.
At the same time, it seems to be a fact of our species that we cannot
help but compare ourselves to our peers, lamenting what we lack and
delighting in having what others do not. Indeed, for some, having more
of a good than others is more important than having the good itself; as
John Stuart Mill observes, “men do not desire merely to be rich, but to be
richer than other men.”1
In “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Harry Frankfurt argues that there is
nothing intrinsically unjust about economic inequality and that what is
important, morally, is not that everyone have the same amount of money,
but that everyone have enough. Frankfurt’s argument has become a stan-
dard objection to egalitarianism, and the article regarded as a seminal
contribution to sufficientarian theory. Frankfurt also has something to
say about the good life, about contentment, and about the Sisyphean
quest for perfection, and these insights are worth revisiting now, in light
of our contemporary infatuation with comparing and ranking things
ðuniversities, graduate programs, journals, etc.Þ, our cultural perfection-
ism, and rising social, professional, and existential restlessness. Frankfurt
teaches us that when we have the things that we want, and these things
are good enough—even if imperfect, and even if others have more—
then there is nothing to be dissatisfied about.
* A retrospective essay on Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics 98
ð1987Þ: 21–43. All unattributed page references are to this article. I thank Tulane’s School
of Liberal Arts and the Murphy Institute for supporting this work.
1. John Stuart Mill, “On Social Freedom: Or the Necessary Limits of Individual Free-
dom Arising out of the Conditions of Our Social Life,” Oxford and Cambridge Review ð June
1907Þ: 69.
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Why are interpersonal comparisons pernicious? There are two rea-
sons. First, they are undignified. To become discontented as a result of such
1172 Ethics July 2015a comparison is, Frankfurt says, to let another person dictate what is
meaningful in one’s own life, thus “divert½ing a person’s attention away
from endeavoring to discover—within his experience of himself and of
his life—what he himself really cares about and what will actually satisfy
him” ð23Þ. In addition, we abstractly injure those who have even less than
we do when we allow these comparisons to damage our happiness. With
over a billion human beings living in conditions of extreme poverty, there
is something depraved about failing to enjoy a steak dinner because the
person at the next table is eating lobster thermidor.
Second, interpersonal comparisons make us unhappy. Sophie de-
velops a plan of life which includes obtaining some good G in a certain
measure. Through talent and effort she does so. She is content until she
finds out that Bill has more of G than she. But why should that matter to
Sophie? She has exactly what she wanted. Moreover, Bill may be unsat-
isfied, since his plan of life might include possessing G in greater mea-
sure than he has. Thus, Sophie might, perversely, be upset about suc-
ceeding where another has failed.
We must also keep in mind that pursuits of goods take place within
a holistic plan of life. Sophie forwent some opportunities in pursuit of G,
and Bill forwent even more given his greater appetite for G. For this
reason, comparing oneself to a peer along a single dimension ðe.g., the
possession of GÞ is uninformative; the fact that my peer has more of G
than I do gives me no reason to be envious or resentful, since his plan of
life might be in shambles while mine is satisfactory.
Frankfurt also defends the ideal of contentment against our per-
fectionistic impulses, and in doing so prefigures the findings of recent
empirical research: perfectionists die younger,2 are more vulnerable to
depression,3 and have worse sex lives.4 And perfectionist academics pro-
duce less and lower quality research than their nonperfectionist col-
leagues.52. Prem S. Fry and Dominique L. Debats, “Perfectionism and the Five-Factor Per-
sonality Traits as Predictors of Mortality in Older Adults,” Journal of Health Psychology 14
ð2009Þ: 513–24.
3. Paul L. Hewitt, Gordon L. Flett, and Evelyn Ediger, “Perfectionism and Depression:
Longitudinal Assessment of a Specific Vulnerability Hypothesis,” Journal of Abnormal Psy-
chology 105 ð1996Þ: 276–80.
4. A. Marie Habke, Paul L. Hewitt, and Gordon L. Flett, “Perfectionism and Sexual
Satisfaction in Intimate Relationships,” Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment
21 ð1999Þ: 307–22.
5. Simon B. Sherry et al., “Perfectionism Dimensions and Research Productivity in
Psychology Professors: Implications for Understanding the ðMalÞAdaptiveness of Perfec-
tionism,” Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 42 ð2010Þ: 273–83.
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Those self-interested grounds aside, as with interpersonal compar-
isons we have moral reasons to avoid perfectionism. Frankfurt points
Mulligan On Frankfurt’s “Equality as a Moral Ideal” 1173them out to us: “Suppose that a man deeply and happily loves a woman
who is altogether worthy. We do not ordinarily criticize the man in such
a case just because we think he might have done even better” ð40Þ. Even
if it were true that this man could have “done better,” and even if he
would have incurred no costs in doing so, surely he has no grounds for
complaint and it would be wrong to criticize him. Once again, the rea-
son is that when one has something that is good, and meaningful, and
lacking for so many, then one has a moral responsibility to appreciate
and enjoy it.
The theoretical lesson of “Equality as a Moral Ideal” is that the
pursuit of equality may distract us from what is truly important: ensuring
that everyone has sufficient economic resources. As I have tried to illu-
minate here, the article can also serve as a practical guide for living a
happy and principled life. And it is the mark of a great work of philos-
ophy, like Frankfurt’s, that even after teaching us much, when we look
at it fresh, from a different perspective, we learn something new.This content downloaded from 128.148.231.34 on Thu, 9 Jul 2015 14:01:31 PM
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